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ABSTRACT
Collisions at sea have and continue to be one of the most misunderstood phenomena of our
modem transportation era. This thesis is a case analyis of the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
(CVN 69) collision. Building on data from the National Transportation Safety Board's and the United
States Navy Judge Advocate General Corps' investigations, it attempts to resolve inconsistencies between
these governmental sources and interviews from four of the six principal officers involved in the mishap.
The findings reveal that numerous causal factors were not sufficiently explored by the investigative
bodies. Of greatest significance, was the neglect of the EISENHOWER bridge organization, which was
in disarray in the moments prior to the collision. This disorganization was the result of a six-month
deployment in which specific Officers oi the Deck focused their watch routines on the whims of the
ship's Navigator. This dependence resulted in a poor decision process, and ultimately the inability to
act appropriately in situations requiring prompt action.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE ]UtSEAC QUESTIONS
On 29 August 1988, the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
collided with the Spanish collier, URDULIZ, in the Entrance
Reach Channel of Chesapeake Bay. The collision occurred
approximately 4,000 yards from the EISENHOWER's home pier.
What is so interesting about the EISENHOWER collision is that
the ship which she rammed was anchored. How is it that such
a controlled and established procedure (entering port), could
systematically breakdown in the moments prior to the
collision?
In the aftermath of the incident, two separate
investigations were undertaken to ascertain the causes of this
collision. The United States' Navy Judge Advocate General
Corps (JAG) and the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) were tasked with these inquiries. What were the
findings of these reports and to what extent did they
complement each other? Were there any other factors that
should have been considered in the inquiries that were not
brought out? And finally, did the collision change entering
port procedures for the two main aircraft carrier commands?
In other words did the collision make a difference?
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The findings of the investigations identified numerous
factors leading to the collision. The main reason cited in
both investigations was the lack of swift, prudent action
taken by the EISENHOWER bridge watch team, specifically the
CO, Navigator, and the OOD, to avoid the URDULIZ. This
thesis, reconstructing events of the morning of the collision,
will attempt to show that the inaction of the bridge team was
not the only determinant of the collision. Primarily, the
core of this thesis is to offer another interpretation of why
the collision occurred and to explain what other causal
factors were critical to the overall understanding of the
EISENHOWER collision.
B. STRUCTURE OF THESIS
To properly address these questions and to provide
significant background information, a historical case on the
EISENHOWER accident is presented in Chapter II. Chapter III
is a summary of the NTSB and Navy JAG investigations on the
reasons for the collision. This author provides his own
interpretation of the findings and factors concerning the
collision in Chapter IV, and generates a different
perspective of the bridge environment onboard the EISENHOWER.
The results of the author's findings indicate that there were
additional factors that were either not explored in the
investigations, or were glossed over. Also contained in
Chapter IV is an overview of Perrow's typology matrix found in
2
his book Normal Accidents with an application to the
EISENHOWER collision. Finally, Chapter V consists of the
summary and conclusion.
C. NXTRODOLOGY
This thesis employed a case study approach in its design,
and relied on qualitative methods such as interviews and
archival research to collect the data. Information gathered
from informal, personal interviews of four of the six key
officers on the bridge (Officer of the Deck, Junior Officer of
the Deck, Junior Officer of the Watch, and the Helm Safety
Officer) at the time of the accident supplemented the reports
of the formal investigations.
D. SCOPE/BENEFITS
This thesis examines the U.S. Navy's largest capital ship,
the aircraft carrier. The awesome power and presence of the
aircraft carrier has long been a trademark of American
diplomacy abroad. The passage: "Speak softly and carry a big
stick" came to define the carrier's role during the late 1980s
as the Cold War spiralled to an end. The strength of the
carrier rests in its ability to swiftly travel to any foreign
shore in the event of a crisis. Thus, the importance of the
aircraft carrier cannot be ignored, as evident in the latest
"bottom-up" review performed by the Clinton Administration.
A 12 carrier force has become the centerpiece of naval warfare
3
strategy. What does this say about the importance of the
carrier? It clearly and unequivocally states that the U.S.
cannot maintain the profile of a superpower without the
potency of this imposing ship.
This thesis was not an attempt to judge the imperfections
of such a large ship, nor was it intended to discredit or pass
judgment on those officers involved in the collision. Rather,
it sought to illustrate the risk of operating a large ship in
a narrow, inadequately defined channel, and to more fully
elaborate on the explanations for the causes of the EISENHOWER
collision. The EISENHOWER incident demonstrates that the
unexpected can happen. It is hoped that this thesis can serve
as a source of knowledge on how to prepare for the unexpected.
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II. THE EISErHOWER COLLISION
A. OVERVIEW
On 29 August 1988, at approximately 0821, the USS DWIGHT
D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69) collided with the Spanish bulk carrier,
URDULIZ. The EISENHOWER was returning from her first extended
deployment in almost three years, and was transiting the
recently narrowed Entrance Reach Channel. The BISEMHOWER
sustained over two million dollars damage to her number 2
aircraft elevator and along the starboard side where the
impact took place. The URDULIZ damage totalled over 350
thousand dollars and was confined to the bow. There were no
injuries to personnel on either ship, nor did the collision
render either ship unseaworthy.[Ref. 2:p. v] Figure lI-i






FiueI-if Chr f h c i-etst
6,
B. HISTORY
The EISENHOWER completed an 18 month Complex Overhaul
(COH)' at Newport News Shipyard and Drydock in April of 1987.
After returning to her home pier at the Norfolk Naval
Operating Base (NOB) she began an intense period of underway
workups. Most of the junior officers and enlisted personnel
had little or no underway experience. This ten month period
of workups would advance this experience dramatically to a
highly seasoned crew ready and able to deploy for an extended
deployment. The EISENHOWER and her crew were ready for their
Mediterranean Sea deployment and to sail again.
The ship, in anticipation of the upcoming Mediterranean
Sea deployment, began a Pre-Overseas Movement (POM) 2 period in
January of 1988. During this period, crewmembers were
expected to take leave and enjoy as much time with their
families as possible. The next six months on the EISENHOWER
would be spent patrolling the waters of the Mediterranean Sea
on a scheduled deployment.
'Complex Overhaul is a scheduled shipyard maintenance period
for aircraft carriers. All new upgrades are made to the ship
during this eighteen month period, including refueling of
the nuclear reactor and replacement of catapult systems.
27he POM period consists of the ship beginning a gradual
buildup of supplies and spare parts for a 6 month
deployment. The process is particularly painful to the
Supply Department which must ensure everything the ship




The routine deployment commenced on 29 February 1988 and
was characterized by extensive underway training. During this
training, the crew conducted numerous SELEXs 3 ; the scores
received on these graded exercises revealed to some extent the
ship's flawless performance. (Such exercises as man overboard,
precision anchoring, and Sea Sparrow missile shoots were
conducted during the SELEXs.)
The ship also made numerous ports of call over the 6
months and experienced no loss of aircraft or personnel prior
to the last port call (an airman committed suicide immediately
after the ship got underway from Cannes, France for the
transit back to Norfolk). The outstanding performance on the
SELEXs and the lack of any discrediting incident over the six
month deployment did not go unnoticed. Indications were that
the EISENHOWER would be awarded the Battle HE".
3SELEX is an acronym for selected exercises; each ship in a
particular class must accomplish, with certain proficiency,
a number of selected exercises. These exercises are then
graded by impartial graders (usually warfare qualified
officers or senior enlisted) for submission in the
competition for the Battle "E".
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D. THE 71NAL LUG OF TER TRANSIT
On the morning of 27 August, the EISENHOWER anchored in
Bermuda to board approximately 500 male relatives and friends
for the ship's "Tiger Cruise"' back to Norfolk. This last leg
of the transit was anticlimactic; the crew had spent much of
the transit on daily watches with relatives or friends,
showing them the job or jobs they were responsible for on a
daily basis. The atmosphere on the ship was light and
spirited; although, with the arrival of the "tigers" the
propensity to keep later hours and reminisce was strong.
The bridge watch team that would pilot the ship into
Norfolk was determined; the Conning Officer/Junior Officer of
the Deck (JOOD) along with the Officer of the Deck (OOD)
conducted an entering port brief on the afternoon of 28 August
for the Commanding Officer (CO), Executive Officer (XO),
Navigator, Operations Officer, First Lieutenant, and all radar
navigation and bridge watch personnel. The following items
were briefed [Ref. 2:p. 6]:
"* Relocation of buoys from the entrance to Thimble Shoals to
Pier 12, in particular, the western relocation of
Elizabeth River Buoy 1 to a point 350-400 yards inside the
previously marked channel.
"* A new navigation track in the vicinity of Thimble Shoals.
"* Slowing to 5 knots prior to crossing the Hampton Roads
Bridge Tunnel for docking pilot pickup.
4A term used by the Navy to describe an event where male
civilian guests of the Navy and family and friends of
crewmembers board the ship to ride back into port. It allows
the guests to experience firsthand the rigors of life at sea.
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* Weather, currents, and tides expected at the time of
entry.
"* Expected helicopter operations.
"* Order of return for the battle group ships.
"* Setting of the low visibility detail.
* Assignment of the ready anchor.
The EISENHOWER Navigation Department (Navigator, Assistant
Navigator, and the Chief Quartermaster) had been briefed by
the Navigator of the relieving carrier, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY
(CV 67), in the Mediterranean Sea about the relocation of
buoys in Thimble Shoals Channel and the narrowing of the
channel. The CO, Navigator, and the Assistant Navigator (the
OOD for entering Norfolk) expressed concern at the brief about
this new buoy alignment, but all were confident in their
ability to safely navigate the 1,092 foot, 95,000 ton
EISENHOWER through the channel.
The EISENHOWER's track through Entrance Reach Channel was
intentionally laid by the Navigator along the northwest edge
of the charted reach to compensate for the new position of
Elizabeth River Buoy 1. The EISENHOWER's new track passed
within 200 yar6s of anchorage ZULU (where the URDULIZ was
anchored) and was tangent to X-RAY and YANKEE anchorages 250
yards from the center of the channel (all anchorages are shown
in Figure 11-2).
10
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The new buoy positions were correctly plotted on the bridge
and Combat Information Center (CIC) charts in accordance with
the appropriate Notice to Mariners. [Ref. 2:p. 6]
1. Key Bridge Personnel and Their Backgrounds
a. ua ng Officer
The CO was a 51 year old aviator with the rank of
Captain; he assumed command of the EISENHOWER in October of
1986. At the time of the collision, he had served as a
commissioned officer for about 28 years with over 14 years of
sea duty. Prior to his command tour on the EISENHOWER, he
served 2 years as the CO of the USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS 3) and
approximately 3 years as the XO on the USS CARL VINSON (CVN
70), a sister ship of the EISENHOWER. As a CO and XO, he had
completed numerous transits of the Hampton Roads channels.
During the evening prior to the collision, the CO reported he
had slept well in his cabin between 2130 and 0430. The only
interruptions were calls from the OOD about vessel
traffic.[Ref. 2:p. 12]
b. Navigator
The Navigator was a 42 year old aviator with the
rank of Commander; he assumed the duties of Navigator in
November 1986. At the time of the collision, he had been a
commissioned officer for about 20 years. Prior to this
assignment, he had accumulated 2 1/2 years of sea duty aboard
the USS MIDWAY (CV 41). While onboard the MIDWAY he served as
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the Assistant Navigator from September 1976 to January 1979
and also qualified as OOD. Upon being assigned to the
EISEMHOWER, he completed the Navigation Officer Shipboard
Celestial Navigation Course and a 2 day practical shiphandling
course. Prior to the collision, he had completed numerous
transits of the Hampton Roads channels as Navigator of the
EISENHOWER. He stated that he had "...plenty of sleep..." the
night before entering Norfolk harbor. He had slept from 2100
to 0300 with two brief interruptions from the OOD. He awoke
at 0300 and arrived on the bridge at 0330.[Ref. 2:p. 12-13]
c. Officer of the Deck
The OOD was a 32 year old aviator with the rank of
Lieutenant; he assumed the duties as Assistant Navigator in
June 1987 for his first shipboard assignment. At the time of
the collision, he had served as a commissioned officer for
about ten years. He had served as the Assistant Navigator
during the ship's underway workups and had qualified as OOD in
August 1987. He had never served as OOD during a transit into
Hampton Roads. He said he slept five hours the night prior to
entering Norfolk harbor; he awoke at 0300 and arrived on the
bridge at 0345 to assume duties as Navigation Officer. At
0530, the Navigator assumed the duties of Navigation Officer
and the Assistant Navigator assumed the duties as OOD for
entering port.[Ref. 2:p. 13]
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d. Coaing Officer
The Conning Officer was a 22 year old Surface
Warfare Officer (SWO) designate with the rank of Ensign; he
assumed the duties of a division officer in December 1987 for
his first shipboard assignment. At the time of the collision,
he had served as a commissioned officer for a little over one
year. He had been onboard less than ten months and was not
JOOD qualified; this was his first entry into the Hampton
Roads port area as a qualified bridge watchstander. According
to ship's policy, the conning of the ship in restricted
waters is a requirement which must be completed prior to being
designated a JOOD. [Ref. 2:p. 6]
e. Junior Officer of the Watch
The JOOW was a 21 year old SWO designate with the
rank of Ensign; he assumed the duties of a division officer in
December 1987 for his first shipboard assignment. At the time
of the collision he had served as a commissioned officer for
a little over one year. He had been onboard for less than ten
months and was JOOW qualified. This was his first entry into
the Hampton Roads port area as a qualified bridge
watchstander.[Ref. 2:p. 7]
2. The Bridge Watch and the Hours Before the Collision
At 0530 on the morning of 29 August the sea and anchor
detail was set as had been planned. At the same time the OOD
assumed the watch; this was, as mentioned earlier, his first
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experience as OOD during sea and anchor detail. His normal
station was as the Navigation OfficerJ. The Leading Chief
Petty Officer (LCPO) for Navigation Department assumed the
role of Navigation Officer for the Assistant Navigator during
this transit. Normally the LCPO was the Navigation Plotter
during sea and anchor detail. Although the LCPO had acted
previously as Navigation Officer during sea and anchor
evolutions on destroyer type vessels he had not performed this
function onboard EISENHOWER.[Ref. 2:p. 7]
At 0602, the low visibility detail6 was set in
anticipation of poor visibility due to thunderstorms in the
area. Due to the reouction in visibility, a lack of
dependable visual fixes was not possible; at that time, the
Navigator ordered the navigation lead (the team responsible
for the tracking of the ship along its track) shifted to the
navigation team in the Tactical Operations Plot (TOP). At
0648 the OOD, with the CO's permission, ordered the
Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW) to place the ship's
engineering plant into a "restricted maneuvering" lineup.
'A position held by the Assistant Navigator during sea and
anchor detail.
6A detail that posts additional officers and enlisted
personnel at various strategic points around the ship to act
as extra sets of eyes and ears for waterborne traffic.
7The steam plant lineup that allows for quicker acceleration
and deceleration among the throttlemen in the engine control
rooms. The maneuvering combination is used during special
sea and anchor detail, when coming alongside another ship,
alongside, and in a narrow channel.
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The ship was 5 minutes from entering Thimble Shoals
Channel when the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and COMMANDER,
NAVAL AIR FORCE ATLANTIC FLEET (COMAVAIRLANT) arrived on the
bridge to pay a visit to the CO and the embarked Flag Officer
- COMMANDER, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP TWELVE (COMCRUDESGRU
TWELVE). COMNAVAIRLANT departed at 0732; the SECNAV remained
onboard until 0807.
While transiting Thimble Shoals Channel, the Shipping
Officer contacted the USS THOMAS C. HART (FF 1092), part of
the EISENHOWER Battle Group, on radio and was advised that
ships occupied anchorages X-RAY and ZULU. The Shipping
Officer passed this information to the OOD and the OOD
reported it to the Navigator. At 0726, at the Navigator's
request, the navigation lead was transferred back to the
bridge from TOP. At 0755, the bridge navigation team began
experiencing difficulty obtaining a visual fix off the charted
landside designations.
At approximately 0800, both the CO and OOD recognized
that the true wind was out of the southeast (off the port
beam), that reports from TOP were of negligible set and
drift', and that they visually sighted the URDULIZ off the
starboard bow in ZULU anchorage. At 0804 TOP obtained a radar
fix showing the ship to be on track. [A sunmmary of key events
is shown in Exhibit XI-1.]
$A term to explain the distance a ship is "pushed" off its
intended track by wind and current.
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EXHIBIT ZZ-1
KEY EYES S WHICH OCCURRED PRIOR
0530 Sea and anchor detail set
0602 Low visibility detail set
0648 OOD orders *restricted maneuveringo set
0726 Navigator orders navigation lead switched back
to the bridge
0755 The bridge navigation team begins experiencing
difficulty obtaining a visual fix
0804 TOP obtains radar fix showing ship to be on
rack
Naur.:Nia Tm "auom Safety lBad k
The CO, OOD, and Navigator conferred at 0805, and
based on the ship's proximity to Old Point Comfort, visually
estimated the ship to be on track.
When, at 0806, the OOD ordered the Conning Officer to
begin a pre-planned turn to course 2290 into Entrance Reach
Channel, he discussed with the CO whether the stern of the
ship would clear URDULIZ during the final turn to the navy
piers. They both agreed that the ship would be well clear of




KEY EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED AB THE EIRSKNH
BEGAN HER TON INTO ENTRANCE REACH CHANEL
TI33 EVENTS
The Navigation Plotter, a first class petty
0806 officer, reports his inability to obtain a fix
to the Navigation Officer
Navigation Officer instructs bearing takers to
attempt fixes at one minute intervals
Navigation Officer reports problem of obtaining
visual fixes to Navigator
Bridge Liaison reports that the ship is on
track
Navigator receives true wind calculation from
JOOW - 152 degrees at 23 knots (off the port
beam)
CIC designates URDULIZ "Skunk Z" bearing 238
degrees at 2800 yards
By the completion of the turn to 2290, the CO,
Navigator, and OOD had been informed of the
bridge navigation team to obtain a visual fix
Once on course 2290, the O0D obtained from the
_JOOW a bearing drift on URLULIZ
Source: National Trampoflatiom Safety Bloan .n .iato
The ship continued its transit along Entrance Reach Channel.




MY EVENTS WHICH OCCUR.ZD AFTER THE
EISENHOWER ENTERED INTO ENTRANCE REACH CHANNEL
TnIE EVENTS
0807 The ship enters Entrance Reach Channel.
SECKAV departs the ship via H-46 helicopter.
Navigation Plotter again calls Ono fix".
Navigation Officer checks status of all bridge
gyros; he finds them functioning properly.
Navigation Officer orders all bearing takers to
reconfirm their targets.
Navigator checks the MK 19 Gyro Repeater
against the Ship's Inertial Navigation System(SINS); he finds them to be within 1/2 degree
of each other.
Radar navigation team in TOP again reports the
ship on track and passing red buoy 22 to
starboard.
d~•:Nad Tnmor omfty Board veafptiam
The bridge team was in the process of beginning its
final turn to NOB. The OOD, the officer responsible for
maintaining the "big picture", was in the best position to see
what was clearly unfolding - a possible collision course with
the URDULIZ. At 0807 the SECNAV departed the EISEMNOWER via
an H-46 helicopter. The engine noise of the H-46 degraded
communications with bearing takers at their outside stations;
thus, the capability to pass bearing marks to the bridge
Navigation Plotter were extremely degraded, causing even more
difficulty in obtaining an accurate fix.
19
At 0810, the radar navigation team in TOP held the
ship at or slightly right of track. The Bridge Liaison
reported TOP holding the ship on track. TOP again estimated
negligible set and drift. Also, Shipping in CIC reported
"Skunk Z" bearing 236 degrees, course 270', speed 2 knots.
Between 0807-0811 the ship travelled approximately 950 yards,
or about 7.1 knots.[Ref. 1:p. 11]
R. THE FINAL TEN MINUTES
In the final minutes prior to the collision, the din on
the bridge became increasingly loud due to the sighting of the
homecoming crowd at the pier, the media on the bridge, and the
distraction of the URDULIZ as the EISENHOWER trcnsited the
final 4000 yards to her pier. The excitement and anticipation
of returning home diverted the bridge team's attention and
focus from their primary responsibility: safe piloting of the
ship. The ship entered into a state of "extremis'.
At 0811 the Navigator recommended to the OOD to slow to
"bare steerageway"' to arrive on time (0845) at Elizabeth
River buoy 3, the pilot pick-up point. The ship was four
minutes ahead of her estimated time of arrival; the OOD
concurred with this recommendation and instructed the Conning
Officer to slow to 3 knots. The CO did not hear the order to
reduce speed to "bare steerageway". At 0812 "Skunk Z"
9A speed which is just enough to maintain wash over the
rudders allowing steering capability (usually 3-5 knots).
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(URDULIZ) had a bearing of 238 degrees at 1500 yards. At 0813
the Bridge Liaison reported that TOP held the ship 25 yards
right of track. No set and drift was calculated. The 0813
TOP fix was determined using 4 radar arcs. The intersection
of these arcs was a four-sided figure whose sides were 175
yards, 90 yards, 100 yards, and 125 yards in length. The
northwestern corner of this figure placed the ship
approximately 175 yards right of track. A measurement of the
point in the four-sided figure chose by the Piloting Officer
as the ship's position placed the ship 75 yards right of
track, vice the 25 he had reported. At 0813 the USS GLENARD
P. LIPSCOMB (SSN 678) contacted the EISENHOWER on bridge to
bridge radio and requested a port to port passage in Entrance
Reach Channel; this was granted by the OOD. At 0813 another
H-46 helicopter lifted off from the flight deck, again
degrading the reports from the bearing takers to the
Navigation Plotter. At 0814, COMCRUDESGRU TWELVE arrived on
the bridge to discuss SECNAV's visit. The URDULIZ was now
clearly visible to all bridge personnel.
As the ship passed buoy 1 to port at 0815, the Navigation
Officer relieved the Navigation Plotter and took over the
ship's plotting duties. He was unable to obtain a fix on his
initial attempt at time 0815. The Navigation Officer again
ordered all bearing takers to confirm their targets. At
approximately 0815, the URDULIZ faded from the radar at a
point 1200 yards from the EISENHOWER. Members of the watch
21
team considered URDULIZ anchored in ZULU anchorage, with
anchor chain visible, heading into the wind, northwest of the
channel, and no way on. During the period that the bridge
navigation team was unable to obtain a fix, no recommendation
was made by the Navigator to shift the navigational lead back
to TOP. Subsequent to the OOD receiving a single bearing
drift report from the JOOW at 0806, not one watch officer
determined a bearing drift on URDULIZ utilizing the centerline
alidade. However, radar bearings obtained by Shipping in CIC
at 0806, 0810, and 0812 all indicated that URDULIZ had
Constant Bearing, Decreasing Range (CBDR). This information
was displayed on the Surface Contact Status Board behind the
CO's chair on the bridge.
Finally, at 0816 the Bridge Liaison reported that TOP held
the ship 200 yards right of track. The Piloting Officer in
TOP reported to the bridge at 0816 that the nearest hazard to
navigation was shoal water. Informed by the Bridge Liaison of
URDULIZ' position, the Piloting Officer immediately changed
the nearest hazard to navigation to URDULIZ and recommended a
left turn to course 225' to avoid URDULIZ. The Bridge
Liaison, as ordered by the OOD, passed to the Piloting Officer
that a course of 225' was not a sufficient correction to avoid
URDULIZ; he then recommended to continue left to course 2200.
TOP was not even aware of URDULIZ' position in ZULU anchorage
until 0816. The 0811 - 0815 events are shown in Exhibit 11-4.
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XHBIDZT 11-4
KEY VZENTS WHICH OCCURRED FROM
0811 - 0815 INSID ZENTRANCE REACH C•hNNEL
TIM ZVENTs
Navigator recommends slowing to "bare
0811 steerageway"; the ship is four minutes ahead of
schedule. OOD concurs.
CO does not hear order to slow the ship
0812 "Skunk Z" (URDULIZ) bears 238 degrees, 1500
yards and has right bearing drift.
Bridge Liaison reports TOP holds ship 25 yards
0813 right of track. No set and drift calculations
made.
TOP's fix is calculated using four-sided
figure; Piloting Officer's position placed the
ssiip 75 yards right of track, vice the 25
reported.
USS GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB (SSN 678) contacts
EISENHOWER for port to port passage in Entrance
Reach Channel; it is granted by the OOD.
H-46 lifts off, degrading communications.
0814 CO and COMCRUDESGRU TWELVE discuss SECNAV's
visit. URDULIZ is clearly visible.
Ship passes green buoy 1 to port; Navigation
0815 Officer relieves Navigation Plotter; his
initial attempt to obtain a fix fails.
URDULIZ fades from radar 1200 yards from the
EISENHOWER.
Bridge personnel consider URDULIZ at anchor.
While the bridge navigation team fails to
obtain a visual fix, no recommendation is made
by the Navigator to shift the lead back to TOP.
Status board reveals URDULIZ is CBDR
source: National rransporat lon Sarery Boara Investigarion
After the reports from TOP and their recommendation to
continue turning left to course 2200, the OOD ordered and the
Conning Officer executed a course change to 2250. The CO was
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informed by the OOD that the ship's speed was 3 knots and the
CO immediately ordered it increased to 5 knots to obtain more
maneuvering control.
COMCRUDESGRU TWELVE departed the bridge at approximately
0817; he noted the URDULIZ' position off the starboard bow and
heard the order to come left. He assumed the bridge team was
aware of URDULIZ' position and was coming left to clear the
anchored ship. He did not feel that EISENHOWER was standing
into danger. The deck log notes the increase in speed and
course change to have occurred at 0817. Between 0811-0817 the
ship travelled approximately 1,085 yards, an average speed of
5.4 knots.
At 0817, the bridge navigation team obtained the first
good visual fix since 0759. The fix placed the position of
the ship inside ZULU anchorage. At 0817 the USS GLENARD P.
LIPSCOMB passed abeam of the ship in the center of the
channel, 225 yards northwest of Elizabeth River buoy 1.
Other than the recommendations from the Piloting Officer to
come to 2250 and then continue to 2200, no recommendations were
made by the OOD, JOOD, Navigator, or the Navigation Officer,
or any members of the radar navigation team to avoid the
URDULIZ. Any evasive action at -his point could have possibly
prevented a collision.
At 0818 the Conning Officer ordered left 15 degrees
rudder. Immediately thereafter, the CO assumed the Conn and
increased rudder to left 30 degrees. At 0819 the bow of the
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EISENHOWER crossed the bow of the URDULIZ. The CO, OOD, and
Navigator did not consider a collision imminent until after
the bow of the ship had crossed the bow of the URDULIZ. The
ship was now in uextremism! The only way to avoid a collision
at this point was for both ships to execute an evasive
maneuver. Since the URDULIZ was at anchor with no way on, a
collision was inevitable.
The CO moved to AUX Conn"° while continuing to give
rudder orders. The CO ordered right 30 degrees rudder, in
order to swing the stern of the ship to port to avoid the
URDULIZ. The OOD ordered the Boatswain's Mate of the Watch
(BMOW) to sound the collision alarm and warn all personnel to
stand clear of the starboard side of the ship. At 0821, as
indicated in the deck log, the EISENHOWER collided with the
bow of the URDULIZ. The collision was hardly felt by many on
the ship, and the only indication of trouble was the sounding
of the collision alarm. A summary of the events that took




°An auxiliary conning position off the starboard bridge wing
used when conning alongside other ships during underway
replenishments. This station provides a better vantage
point for conning officers.
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Z[HIDIT UX-S
K]RY EV]NTS WHICH OCCU)R3D IN TIM FI-V
XINUTE8 PRIOR TO Til COLLIXSIOK
0816 Bridge Liaison reports TOP holds ship 200 yards
right of track.
Piloting officer switches nearest hazard to
navigation to URDULIZ when he learns of her
position. He recommends coming left to 225
degrees.
Piloting Officer then recommends continuing to
220 degrees.
OOD orders Conn to come to 225 degrees.
0817 CO learns of ship's speed and immediately
increases speed to five knots.
COMCRUDESGRU TWELVE leaves bridge; he does not
feel the EISENHOWER is standing into danger.
Bridge Navigation team obtains first visual fix
since 0759. The fix places the ship inside
ZULU anchorage.
USS GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB passes down the port
beam in the center of the channel.
No action is taken by the OOD to stop the shipprior to her bow crossing the URDULIZ.
0818 Conn orders left 15 degrees rudder; CO assumesthe conn and increases rudder to left 30.
0819 The bow of the EISENHOWER crosses the bow of
the URDULIZ.
CO moves to AUX Conn; he orders right 30
degrees rudder to swing the stern.
OOD orders BMOW to sound the collision alarm.
CO orders right 35 degrees then left 35 degrees
rudder.
0821 The EISENHOWER collides with the URDULIZ.
.o : a4  E IOnpa I-ransporrarlon Sarery Board Invesrwgar ion
Had the CO not assumed the conn from the JOOD when he did,
damage to both ships may have been extensive. His experience
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and composure were indispensable factors that minimized the
effects of the collision. The OOD recommended, after the bows
of the two ships had crossed and an "extremis" situation was
reached, an "emergency full astern* bell. The CO rejected
this recommendation; a backing bell, he judged, would only
exacerbate the situation. Deceleration tables for the
EISENHOWER, however, showed that at a speed of five knots the
ship could have been stopped in approximately 120 yards or 48
seconds after answering an emergency backing bell
(Ref. 4:p. 31.
Following the collision, the CO ordered mall stops. The
deck log indicates the order was given, yet neither the Helm
Safety Officer", nor the Lee Helm heard the CO give the
order from AUX Conn. The ship proceeded an additional 75
yards, entangled with the bow of the URDULIZ, before the order
was acted upon. This delay in answering the "all stops bell
induced more damage to both ships. The two ships remained
joined for approximately 12 minutes; during this period the XO
and First Lieutenant surveyed the EISENHOWER's starboard side
for damage. The XO reported to the CO that there were no
injuries to personnel, no fuel leaks, no damage to ordnance,
and a class "C" fire12 in a power panel had been
"A position filled by a qualified conning officer to monitor
the actions of the helm and lee helmsmen.
12A class of fire that is electrical in nature; it must be
extinguished with carbon dioxide (C0 2 ).
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extinguished. At 0835, the Docking Pilot arrived on the
bridge of the EISENHOWER to pilot the ship under tugboat power
back to Pier 12. The ship arrived at Pier 12 at 0945 - one
hour and 24 minutes after the collision.
According to the URDULIZ' charts, her bow was
approximately 200 yards from the southern boundary of ZULU
anchorage at the time of the collision. The EISENHOWER,
therefore, was at least 200 yards right of her intended track
in the Entrance Reach Channel. The damage, however, was
complete; the time for investigation was now at hand.
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III. TIM COLLISIO INVSTXGATIOKS
A. NTSD INYVNTIATIOW
The NTSB is an independent Federal agency dedicated to
promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and
hazardous materials safety. The agency is mandated by the
Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate
transportation accidents, issue safety recommendations, study
transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety
effectiveness of government agencies involved in
transportation.[Ref. 2:p. il
The safety board makes public its actions and decisions
through accident reports, safety studies, special
investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical
reviews. The NTSB's report interprets the collision of the
URDULIZ by the USS DWIGHT D. EISEZHOWER and the safety issues
involved in the accident. Recommendations that addressed
these safety issues were presented to the United States Coast
Guard and the United States Navy.[Ref. 2:p. vii
The NTSB was notified of the collision approximately two
hours after it occurred. Safety Board investigators were
dispatched on 29 August 1988 to Norfolk, Virginia. The NTSB
and the Coast Guard agreed that it would be in the public
interest for the Safety Board to direct the investigation with
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Coast Guard participation. The agreement was made pursuant to
the Memorandum of Understanding dated 28 September 1981
between the two agencies.[Ref. 2:p. 41]
The investigation's focus was centered on the discussion
of four main safety issues involved in the collision.
(Ref. 2:p. v]
1. The pilot employment practices of the U.S. Navy for its
vessels transiting Norfolk harbor.
2. The location of the anchored URDULIZ in relation to the
channel.
3. The U.S. Navy harbor control of naval vessel traffic.
4. The Entrance Reach Channel width and navigational aids.
Each of these issues will b- Jiscussed along with other
probable causes cited by the NTSB.
1. Pilot Imployment Practices
According to the NTSB's report,
.. the state of Virginia requires foreign vessels,
or U.S. registered vessels departing on or
returning from a foreign voyage to engage the
services of a state pilot. The Federal government
requires a Coast Guard licensed pilot on any U.S.
commercial vessel of more than 1, 600 gross tons or
more on a coastwise voyage while the vessel is in
U.S. "pilotage waters.* The master of a U.S.
commercial vessel can satisfy this requirement by
employing a state pilot with a Federal license or
an independent Federally licensed pilot, or by
utilizing a member of the vessel's crew who has
been issued a Coast Guard pilot's license for
those waters. Federal law ezoludes military and
other public vessels from state and federal pilot
requirements.
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Naval Station Norfolk now and at the time of the
collision contracts the services of pilots within the Hampton
Roads waterways. The Federal pilot association, Cheaspeake
and Interstate Pilots (C&IP), reported that between November
1985 and November 1988 about 292 vessels had been piloted,
most of which had drafts greater than 25 feet. The waterways
around NOB and the Craney Island Fuel Depot are active and
crowded; the Commander, Naval Station Norfolk reported in the
investigation that 2,028 Naval vessels arrived or departed
through the waterways surrounding NOB in a one year period
[Ref. 2:p.22]. The investigation provided evidence that the
norm for Navy vessels transiting Hampton Roads was to not use
the services of pilots between the entrance to Chesapeake Bay
and buoy 3 in Entrance Reach Channel. The utilization of
pilots in this area was viewed by navy ships as a reflection
that ".. .the vessel's crew had less than a professional
shiphandling ability."[Ref. 2:p. 21]
Interviewing the EISEMHOWER's Navigator, the NTSB
discovered that the Navy rarely embarked pilots going in or
out of Norfolk; however, the Navigator had discussed the idea
of a pilot with the CO. According to the Navigator, he
reported what he had learned on a visit to the Cape Henry
Virginia Pilot Association (VPA) Station to the CO and what
their capabilities were and he (the CO) said, "well, I don't
think we need a pilot, but really I'll leave that to you. If
you really feel strongly that we need a pilot, we'll get a
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pilot.' After thinking about the decision for a period of
time, the Navigator determined that they did not need a pilot.
The CO's unfamiliarity with the Navy's policy on
pilots was revealed in his NTSB interview. When asked about
the Navy's policy in utilizing pilots, the CO replied: "I
really couldn't answer what the Navy policy is, I really don't
know." The investigation summarized the CO's responsibility
as it is presented in Navy Regulations - Title 32 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) Subpart 700.754.[Ref. 2:p. 23]
Title 32 CFR 700.754: Pilotage
(a) The Commanding Officer shall:(1) Pilot the ship under all ordinary
circumstances, but he may employ pilots
whenever in his judgment such employment
is prudent
(2) Not call a pilot on board until the ship
is ready to proceed.
(3) Not retain a pilot on board after the
ship has reached her destination or point
where a pilot is no longer required.
(4) Give preference to licensed pilots.
(5) Pay pilots no more than the logical
rates.
(b) A pilot is merely an adviser to the commanding
officer. His presence on board shall not relieve
the CO or any of his subordinates from their
responsibility for the proper performance of the
duties with which they may be charged concerning
the navigation and handling of the ship.
The practice of employing pilots in Hampton Roads by
the Navy was not enforced policy. Navy COs had the authority
to decide whether they required a pilot; there were no strict
regulations for their use. Since Commanding Officers did not
want to be considered incapable of handling their own ships,
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their employment of pilots was quite low. Of the 2,082 ship
movements in and out of Norfolk from 01 October 1987 to 30
September 1988 (a one year period), less than five percent of
navy ships employed pilots [Ref. 2:p. 16]. This was a Norfolk
NOB quality control problem.
2. The UIDULIZ" Anchorage
The pertinent anchorages in the Entrance Reach Channel
at the time of the collision are labelled as shown in Figure
111-1. Anchorage "A" was the Quarantine, Customs, and
Immigration Anchorage for commercial vessels and was also used
by deep drafts waiting to load or unload their cargo. The
sizable anchorage included the 1,500 foot - radius berth "Z"
in which URDULIZ was anchored. The southern edge of berth "Z"
was located 600 feet north of the northern edge of Entrance
Reach Channel before the channel was narrowed. After the
channel was narrowed, the southern edge was only 300 feet from
the channel edge. In fact, the southern boundary of Anchorage
"A" was also the northern edge of the previous Entrance Reach
Channel, yet was not marked by any navigational buoys. The
explanation for the Coast Guard's decision not to place buoys
near the anchorage was explained as follows: "...when you put
buoys near an anchorage they get run over and serve only as a
hazard to navigation" [Ref.2:p. 34].
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Figure lll-I Anchorages adjacent to Entrance Reach Channel
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In 1984, the Coast Guard had proposed intended changes
for the Hampton Roads waterways around the Norfolk Naval Base.
These modifications were necessary due to the construction of
the Newport News Bridge-Tunnel. To accommodate this
construction, the widening and deepening of the channel was
initiated in 1987. This widening of the channel precipitated
the adoption of new buoy and channel alignments. Subsequent
to these changes, the Coast Guard renamed a segment of
Anchorage "A" to "F" and berth "Z" to "F2". [Ref. 2:p. 21] As
shown in Figure I11-1, the southern edge of Anchorage "F" was
moved north and aligned with the new, northern edge of
Entrance Reach Channel. Also, the southern boundary of new
berth "F2" was nearly the same as the previous berth "Z".
These changes to the affected anchorages became effective on
08 February 1989. The Coast Guard intended these changes to
widen the channel, yet in the end, the most travelled stretch
of Entrance Reach Channel (around the anchorages) was narrowed
by repositioning the present buoy alignment.
As the investigation pointed out, it is difficult for
a any conning team to calculate visually the new northern edge
of the channel. This was because the Coast Guard had not
established a navigational aid in the 3.2 nautical miles
between buoy 22 on the eastern end of the channel and buoy 2
on the western end of the channel [Ref.2:p. 34]. The Coast
Guard considered the depth of the anchorages (greater than 50
feet in most places) and determined that ships would not
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consider these areas outside the channel available for
maneuvering. Had they simply devised a buoy system for the
anchorages, the Coast Guard could have avoided any
misinterpretation by ship navigation teams entering or
departing the channel. The proper marking of the northern
edge of the channel, or the southern edge of the anchorages,
would have greatly decreased the ambiguity of a ship's
navigation team, yet the Coast Guard failed to consider this
factor.
The relocation of the channel's northern boundary in
conjunction with the absence of a methodical buoy system
allowed the EISENHOWER bridge team to become careless in their
attention to the ship's lateral movement through the water.
Had an appropriate buoy system been in place, the bridge team
may have noticed the deviation from its intended course and
took corrective action much earlier, possibly avoiding the
collision.
3. U.S. Navy Harbor Control in Entrance Reach Channel
The Port Operations Department in Norfolk is the
responsible agent for scheduling the movement of all naval
vessels at NOB and those vessels transiting Hampton Roads.
Requirements for the "Movement of Ships at a Naval Station"
are set forth in U.S. Navy Regulations:[Ref. 2:p. 24]
(1) No ship or craft shall be moved or undergo dock trials
during its stay at a naval station, except by the
approval or direction of the commanding officer of such
station.
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(2) A ship arriving at, or departing from, a naval station
shall be furnished such assistance, including tugs,
when available, as in the opinion of the commanding
officer of the naval station or the ship may be
necessary for her safe handling.
These directives suggest that all ship movements were
carefully coordinated within Port Operations and also with the
naval station. This was not necessarily the case. The USS
GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB was inderway in the channel at the same
time as the RXSEHMOWER. With appropriate forethought the Port
Operations schedulers could have avoided having two vessels of
deep displacement in the Entrance Reach Channel at its
narrowest point. The NTSB investigation proceeded to point
out that:
... Port Operations should control naval vessel traffic
so that deep draft vessels (vessels with a draft of 25
feet or more) do not encounter another deep draft naval
vessel when transiting the Entrance Reach Channel[Ref. 2:p. 35].
This is particularly important because of the
EISENHOWER's "shadow zones" and her 36 foot draft. The shadow
zones created by the EISENHOWER's size are depicted in Figure
111-2. The inability of the bridge team to continually
monitor the port-to-port passage of the LIPSCOMB factored in
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If the EISENHOWER had followed its planned track, with its
bridge on the northern edge of the old Entrance Reach
Channel (700 feet wide at buoy 1ER after the changes) its
flight deck would have nshadowedu approximately 590 feet of
channel on its port beam, leaving about 110 feet of the
channel visible from the navigation bridge to buoy 1ER and
the southern side of the new Entrance Reach Channel. Had
the submarine followed a trackline of about 100 - 150 feet
to the left of buoy 1ER, the large shadow zone on the port
side of the EISENHOWER prevents a continuous view of a
vessel with a low profile or a small vessel, if it passes
too close, especially a vessel such as a submarine.
(Ref. 2:p. 211
As stated in the investigation, "...arrivals and
departure times are still coordinated with Port Operations for
shoreside services and to avoid conflict with other naval
vessel movements in the harbor."[Ref. 2:p. 25J This was not
the case on the day of the collision. No attempt was made by
the Port Operations Department to coordinate the arrival of
the Navy's deepest draft combatant, with the departure of a
submarine. The meeting of the two vessels narrowed the
already constricted waterway to a point where the EISMNHOWER
had practically no maneuvering room. Without ample room to
pilot the 95,000 ton ship, the likelihood of any free
navigation to correct an error was systematically reduced.
The Coast Guard had an established regular navigation
area (RNA) to restrict navigation near large naval vessels by
other vessels. This RNA is part of the CFR, Title 33
Paragraph 165.501(d)(11). It requires that:
... no vessel may, without the permission of the Coast
Guard, come within 500 yards from a naval aircraft carrier
or other large naval vessel, which is restricted in its
ability to maneuver in confined waters,...transiting the
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Elizabeth River between the NOB and the Norfolk Naval
Shipyard.... [Ref. 2:p. 25]
The requirement is straightforward in its wording, yet was not
fully complied with on 29 August 1988, and the NTSB
investigation viewed this as non-contributory to the
collision.
4. The Entrance Reach Channel Width and Navigational Aids
During December 1988, the Army Corps of Engineers
(COE) completed channel dredgings at Thimble Shoal, Entrance
Reach, Newport News, and Norfolk Harbor Reach. The COE
dredged 650 feet of the outbound side of the 1,000 foot
Entrance Reach Channel to a depth of 50 feet, and the
remaining 350 feet of the inbound side to a depth of 45 feet.
Also, the Channel was reduced in depth from 1,500 to 1,000
feet.[Ref. 2:p. 19)
Entrance Reach Channel is located between Old Point
Comfort and Fort Wool on the east and Sewells Point in the
west. The southern side of the channel used to be marked with
Elizabeth River Channel Lighted Horn Buoy (LHB) "1" (buoy 1)
near Fort Wool and the Elizabeth River Channel Lighted Buoy
"3" (buoy 3) northwest of Sewells Point (This is depicted in
Figure 111-3). A line drawn between the two buoys (1 and 3)
delineated the southern edge of the channel.
The northern side of the channel was located at the
southern edge of Anchorages wA" (berth wZ") and "B" (berths
"X", "Y", and "W") and on a line between the Naval Ordnance
40
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Lighted Buoy (buoy OTO) east of Old Point Comfort and the
Newport News Channel Lighted Buoy 020 (buoy 2). This was a
distance of approximately 3.5 nautical miles (nm).
[Ref. 2:p. 19]
In early 1988, the Thimble Shoal Lighted Buoy 0220
(buoy 22) was repositioned close to the eastern side of Old
Point Comfort. This created a "hole" in the system; now,
there were no buoys between buoy 22 and buoy 2 on the "new"
northern side of Entrance Reach Channel, a distance of 3.2 nm.
When the Coast Guard was asked why this was permitted, the
witness replied, I... when you put buoys near an anchorage,
they get run over and they serve only as a hazard to
navigation." If an arriving ship followed a course on the
northern side of the channel that corresponded to a line drawn
between buoys 22 and 2, it would encroach the southern edge of
Anchorage "A" and "B", thereby transiting through the
anchorage.[Ref. 2:p. 191
During 1988, buoy 3, also located on the southern side
of the channel was repositioned 200 yards north, on the 50
foot water contour curve. Buoy 1, also located on the south
side of the Entrance Reach Channel, was relocated 700 yards to
the west and renamed buoy IER. These changes reduced the
width of the channel by 500 feet. The width at the opening to
Entrance Reach Channel was now 1,000 feet vice the 1,500 it
had been before the "widening and deepening" project. The
channel "upgrade" also decreased the distance between the
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southern edge of Anchorages HAN and "B" to 700 feet at buoy
1ER and 900 feet near buoy 3. The actual width, therefore,
varied depending on where a ship was located in the channel.
As the CO of the EISENHOWER testified, "...there's not enough
room for two ships to pass. Not carrier-size ships or a
carrier and a submarine.O[Ref. 2:p. 20]
This lack of foresight by the Coast Guard prompted the
bridge piloting team of the EISEMHOWER to rely on their
"seaman's eye" to determine their position in the channel.
Had the northern edge of the channel been clearly delineated
with a buoy system, the bridge team could have used the
natural range provided by the buoys to estimate their position
in the channel.
The investigation did not agree with the Coast Guard's
rationale that placing buoys near an anchorage resulted in
increased hazards to navigation. The NTSB believed that the
northern boundary of Entrance Reach Channel must be marked
with additional buoys to assist conning crews of ships in
determining the movement of their ship and the channel's
limits.[Ref. 2:p. 35]
5. NTSB Reaomendations
The NTSB, as a result of the investigation, supplied
the following recommendations to the U.S. Navy:
* Provide in an appropriate Navy directive, guidance and
requirements to COs of vessels about the use of state and
Federal pilots, considering such areas as changed harbor
configurations, crew experience in transiting the harbor,
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length of time since last transit of the harbor,
congestion or restriction of the waterway to be transited,
and the size of the vessel.
"* Develop and implement a bridge watch team management and
teamwork training program for ship COs, navigators, and
other bridge navigation personnel.
"* Require the Norfolk Naval Station to schedule and control
naval traffic departing or arriving, so that no deep draft
naval vessels meet in the Entrance Reach Channel.
"* Request the Coast Guard extend the RNA to include the
Entrance Reach Channel for aircraft carriers and other
large naval vessels. (refer to p. 31)
"* Establish a newsletter that provides comprehensive vessel
accident information and disseminate it to personnel in
command, navigation, and other shiphandling billets.
"* Disseminate the NTSB report to COs and navigation
department personnel of all aircraft carriers in the
fleet.[Ref. 2:p. 39]
The NTSB also recommended that the Coast Guard "...establish
additional buoys on the northern side of Entrance Reach
Channel to delineate the channel limits."[Ref. 2:p. 40]
As can be seen from the NTSB investigation, the
underlying factor was to establish probable cause for the
collision. The U.S. Navy JAG investigation's underlying
concern was to establish and determine personal blame for the
collision.
B. U.S. NAVY JAG INVESTIGATION
The Navy's investigation into the EISENHOWER collision
began on 30 August 1988. The investigation was conducted by
the ranking Norfolk JAG Officer, Rear Admiral Bernsen. He
received administrative assistance from a team of five
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officers and two enlisted personnel. The investigation was
completed and forwarded to COMNAVAIRLANT on 19 September 1988.
The underpinning of the Navy's investigation rested in the
written statements of the relevant personnel implicated in the
collision. Based on those statements, secondary questions
were developed by the investigating officer to further clarify
certain areas. Subsequent to a review of the written
responses, selected personnel were personally interviewed to
acquire additional information.[Ref. 1:p. iv]
Since the Navy's investigation was originated, developed,
and finalized prior to the NTSB investigation, the chief
considerations of the Navy JAG investigation were to determine
accountability and to take prompt, punitive action against
those relevant officers and enlisted personnel; also,
timeliness was ensured to assist attorneys in litigation
matters with the Spanish government. A majority of the
evidence supplied in the JAG investigation is identical to the
NTSB's, therefore, such information will not be reproduced
unless relevant.
1. Meteorological Conditions at the Time of the Collision
The effect of the currents and wind was emphasized in
the JAG investigation was not in the NTSB investigation. The
R!SE1'/OWER's Navigator, who knew the forecasted tidal
currents, should have exercised caution in determining his
intended track; he did not. The following table (TABLE 111-1)
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provides the tidal currents used by the Navigator in laying
out his track. Considering this a significant part of the
evidence, the JAG Officer also calculated these currents for
the morning of the collision and were included in the JAG
investigation.
TABLR 111-1
TIDAL CURRENTS FOR THE NAMPTON ROADS
AREA FOR 29 AUGUST 1988
I TINE STATE OF CURRENT I -SPEED IDIRECTIO I
EAST OF OLD POINT COMFORT (OPC)
0421 SLACK WATER 0.0 KTS
0807 FLOOD 1.7 KTS 2510 T
0931 MAXIMUM FLOOD 2.2 KTS 2510 T
SOUTH OF OPC
0646 SLACK WATER 0.0 KTS ---
0815 FLOOD 1.5 KTS 2400 T
0938 MAXIMUM FLOOD 2.7 KTS 2400T
NORTHWEST OF FORT WOOL
0614 SLACK WATER 0.0 KTS -_-_ -
0815 FLOOD 1.6 KTS 2400T
0851 MAXIMUM FLOOD 2.1 KTS 2400T
_ID-CNANNEL AT OPC
0646 SLACK WATER 0.0 KTS ---
0815 FLOOD 1.2 KTS 2600T
0951 MAXIMUM FLOOD 2.5 KTS 2600T
mM " ..• JAG u ves4
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As shown in TABLE 111-1, only one current was
applicable the morning of the collision, yet there are two
types: flood and ebb. A flood current is the flow of the
current from the ocean or sea, while an ebb current is the
flow of the current to the ocean or sea. During the
EISENHOWER's entire transit of the Hampton Roads channels, the
currents were in a flood state. The Navigator should have
realized that in this state the current would always be at the
ship's port quarter or port beam in Entrance Reach Channel,
complicating any type of slow maneuvering within the channel.
This, along with the true wind blowing from the southeast, or
more accurately off the ship's port beam, produced an effect
that left a majority of the EISENHOWER's maneuvering control
to the forces of nature. The EISENHOWER's bridge team did not
make necessary corrections in regard to the effects of the
wind and the current and by doing so allowed the ship to stand
into danger, resulting in a collision. What is most
perplexing is that the information for these natural forces
was readily available (tidal current calculations and updated
true winds whenever required), but not employed by any of the
key bridge navigation personnel (Navigator, OOD, Chief
Quartermaster, Navigation Plotter, or the Piloting Officer in
TOP) in transiting the channel.
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2. Opinions from the JAG Investigation
The investigation did produce numerous opinions on the
reasons for the collision, however, only a few will be
presented. The weight of the JAG investigation lay heavily on
the errors made by the bridge team, more specifically the CO,
Navigator, and the OOD. The OOD, the investigation pointed
out, had not previously acted as sea and anchor OOD, and that
his normal position during sea and anchor evolutions was
Navigation Officer.
The investigation found only two personnel on the
bridge not fully qualified in their respective positions; one,
as mentioned earlier, was the JOOD. In accordance with
EISENHOWER policy, he needed to conn the ship into port to
complete his JOOD qualifications. Also, the Quartermaster of
the Watch (QMOW), a third class petty officer, had not
completed his qualifications as QMOW in accordance with PQS
NAVEDTRA 43492-2AQ2. Neither of these non-qualifications was
a direct factor in the collision.[Ref. 1:p. 18]
An opinion was also expressed on the extended length
(six months) away from Norfolk.[Ref. 1:p. 19]
Since six months had passed since anyone in authority on
the bridge or in TOP had entered or left the Port of
Norfolk, their inherent familiarity with the navigational
characteristics of the port was reduced. This was a
contributing factor in the collision.
It was noted that the turnover brief between the EISEMHOWER
and the KENNEDY in the Mediterranean Sea was complete in its
information about the buoy relocation and fully understood by
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the CO, Navigator, and OOD (Assistant Navigator). Therefore,
as the investigation revealed, one of the causes of the
collision rested with the unfamiliarity of the channel by all
bridge team personnel. Another finding by the JAG disclosed
that the number of high level visitors (SECNAV, COMNAVAIRLANT,
COMCRUDESGRU TWELVE) and non-essential personnel on the
bridge, plus helicopter operations that continued until just
four minutes prior to the collision may have distraated the
bridge team. The investigation did not determine these
factors to be causal to the collision.[Ref. l:p. 17]
The investigation also expressed concern over the
repositioning of Elizabeth River Buoys 1 and 3 in March 1988.
By relocating these buoys, the Entrance Reach Channel width
was effectively reduced by almost 500 feet, forcing incoming
vessels to steam much closer to Anchorages "A" and "B" and
berths "W", "X", iY", and "Z".[Ref. 1:p. 17]
Along with the repositioning of the buoys, the
outbound track of the submarine LIPSCOMB, which was in the
center of the new channel, about 225 yards southeast of berth
"Z", further narrowed the channel and the margin of safety for
the safe navigation of the EISENHOWER [Ref. l:p. 18].
Also, the URDULIZ was not anchored in the center of
berth "Z", but in the southwest quadrant of the berth, her bow
approximately 200 yards inside the anchorage circle. This,
combined with the relocation of the buoys and the passing of
the LIPSCOMB, reduced the overall width which the EISENHOWER
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could safely sail to just under 400 yards. In a situation of
high winds off the port beam and a flood current on the port
quarter, the reduced width required zero navigation error by
the bridge navigation team in the transit of Entrance Reach
Channel. Even in a situation with favorable weather
conditions, the channel width would have created a demanding
sailing environment. The JAG investigation did consider this
a contributing factor in the collision.[Ref. 1:p. 19]
Another interesting point verified the difficulty the
bridge navigation team experienced in comprehending what was
actually on their navigation charts. After the turn to course
2290 at Old Point Comfort, evidence from the EISENHOWER's
navigation chart indicated that lines of bearing did, in fact,
cross, and that the resulting estimated position showed the
ship to be well right of track - as much as 400-600 yards.
The Navigation Officer (the Chief Quartermaster) considered
this to be an anomaly and did not give it proper attention.
He may have determined, prior to relieving the Navigation
Plotter, that none of the Plotter's previous marks were
accurate and thus the confidence in his personnel was reduced.
This failure to accurately interpret the data from the chart
was a contributing factor in the collision.[Ref. l:p. 21]
The investigation also concluded that information
received from TOP and specifically the Piloting Officer was
inadequate. His failure to assess the radar error caused by
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radar land return proved to be critical; had he reported that
the ship may have been as much as 175 yards right of track, a
possibility supported by the radar plot, vice the 25 yards
right of track he reported, the bridge team may have had time
to correct their continued drift towards the northwest and the
URDULIZ. Without good visual fixes and a reliance on the
presumed accuracy of the radar fixes from TOP, those in
authority (CO, Navigator, and OOD) failed to realize the
danger to the ship. Even after the report at 0816 from TOP
that the ship was 200 yards right of track, no immediate and
significant corrective action was taken prior to the
EISENHOWER crossing the URDULIZ' bow. At this point, the only
way to avoid a collision was for both ships to maneuver. This
failure by the bridge team was a contributing factor in the
collision.[Ref. 1:p. 20]
The lack of maintaining a vigilant watch on the
URDULIZ' bearing drift was also instrumental. The JOOW's
position near the centerline alidade convinced the 0OD that
the JOOW had a continual watch on the URDULIZ. This was not
the case. The JOOW usually operated the RAYCAS radar set to
determine which contacts required the most attention. During
the transit of Entrance Reach Channel, the RAYCAS was being
operated by the navigation team to check bearings received
from the outside bearing takers. The JOOW's job as he
perceived it, "... was to stay out of the way and let things
run on auto-pilot."[Ref. 1:p. 21]
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The last time the OOD checked the bearing drift on
URDULIZ, he determined that there was slight right bearing
drift, and that URDULIZ would pass safely down the starboard
side. Subsequent to that determination, neither the OOD, nor
any bridge personnel attempted to verify bearing drift. The
OOD's failure to maintain supervision of his watch team was a
factor in the collision.[Ref. 1:p. 22]
The Navigator's role in the collision, as judged by
the investigation, was twofold. First, he failed to recognize
the rapidity which the EISENHOWER was being set to the
northwest side of the channel. Based on his experience, he
should have:[Ref. l:p. 21]
"* ascertained why good visual fixes were not being obtained
by his navigation team for over 20 minutes;
"* considered relieving the Navigation Plotter earlier and
replacing him with the Chief Quartermaster/Navigation
Officer;
"* personally checked the accuracy of the information coming
from TOP;
"* forcefully made the CO aware of the navigation team not
being able to obtain a good visual fix and the likelihood
that the ship was being set;
"* not recommended slowing to "bare steerageway", an order
that only worsened the ship's control problem in the
confined waterway.
Secondly, the Navigator did not perform his role as
the ship's pilot. The safety of the course/intended track
back to Pier 12 was his responsibility, yet he did not
exercise caution in the development of that course. The
expected tidal currents, expected weather conditions, and
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schedule for pilot pickup were all known, yet the Navigator
chose not to work any margin of error into the intended track
computation. The CO had allowed the Navigator to make the
decision on the use of a pilot prior to entering Thimble Shoal
Channel, but the Navigator decided that the ship did not
require one. The extended length of the EISENHOWER's
deployment should have been enough to convince the Navigator
to employ a pilot. In the end, the Navigator's complete
failure to take some, or any, action prior to the collision
was a definitive factor in the collision.[Ref. l:p. 22]
As for the CO, the investigation concluded that he
failed to recognize his ship was being set right of track.
Given his experience and qualifications, the CO should have
taken the following actions:[Ref. l:p. 23]
"* questioned why good visual fixes were not being obtained
and insisted the Navigator confirm the positions reported
by TOP;
"* ordered bearing drift readings be taken to determine
URDULIZ' drift rather than relying on "seaman's eye";
"* requested the submarine LIPSCOMB stand clear, so as to
provide his ship with more maneuvering room in clearing
URDULIZ;
"* being aware that the true wind was greater than 20 knots,
considered calling for earlier arrival of tugs and a
pilot;
"* paid attention to the ordered speed of "bare steerageway"
(3 kts).
As mentioned in the NTSB investigation, the CO was made aware
by the 0816 report from TOP that his ship was 200 yards right
of track.[Ref. 1:p. 23-24]
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The CO ... failed to comprehend that EISENHOWER was
standing into danger, and failed to take immediate and
prudent action to stop the ship or maneuver so as to avoid
collision. Such action might have included letting go the
ready anchor, ordering all back emergency or some other
rudder and engine order combination to avoid collision
with URDULIZ. The CO's failure to take such action was the
primary factor in the collision. The ultimate
responsibility for the collision rests with the CO. It was
his error in judgment that allowed EISENHOWER to proceed
beyond the point of extremis and collide with an anchored
vessel.
The JAG investigation's recommendations for discipline and for
changes in the Hampton Roads area waterways follow.
3. U.S. Navy JAG Corps Recamiondations
The following recommendations were handed down from
the U.S. Navy JAG Corps Investigation:
1. That the CO be charged with violation of Article 110,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Negligent Hazarding of
a Naval Vessel, for failing to recognize the potential
for collision brought about by attempting to pass
URDULIZ close aboard without sufficient regard for the
effects of wind and current and for failing to take
immediate and prudent actions to avoid a collision. If
found guilty, it is further recommended he be awarded a
punitive letter of reprimand.
2. That the Navigator be charged with violation of Article
92, Dereliction of Duty, for his failure to ascertain
the reasons why good visual fixes were not being
reported by the bridge navigation team for a period of
about 20 minutes, his failure to turn the navigation
lead over to TOP, his failure to personally check the
accuracy of the radar navigation plot, his failure to
exercise prudent and good seamanship when he recommended
slowing to "bare steerageway" under wind and current
conditions known to cause rapid and serious set and
drift, and his failure to properly inform the CO that
good visual fixes were not being obtained by the bridge
navigation team. If found guilty, it is further
recommended he be awarded a punitive letter of
reprimand.
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3. That the OOD be charged with violation of Article 92,
Dereliction of Duty, for his failure to properly
supervise the JOOW and ensure that bearing drift on
URDULIZ was being ascertained at regular intervals in a
proper manner. If found guilty, it is further
recommended he be awarded a non-punitive letter of
caution.
4. That the Navigation Officer (Chief Quartermaster) be
charged with violation of Article 92, Dereliction of
Duty, for his failure to recognize and report that the
visual bearings obtained and plotted by the bridge
navigation team were essentially correct and that the
estimated positions that were being plotted placed the
BISENHOWER considerably right of the planned Entrance
Reach track. If found guilty, it is further recommended
he be awarded a non-punitive letter of caution.
5. That the JOOW be awarded a non-punitive letter of
caution, for his failure to adequately monitor the
bearing drift of URDULIZ in accordance with the
provisions of the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders.
6. That the Piloting Officer be awarded a non-punitive
letter of caution, for his failure to recognize and
report that the 0813 radar fix was in effect an
estimated position and, depending on interpretation,
could have placed the ship as much as 175 yards to the
right of track.
7. That the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
(CINCLANTFLT) officially and formally review the various
U.S. Coast Guard and Army COE ongoing programs modifying
the Hampton Roads channels and anchorages; this
evaluation to include the effect narrowing the channels
has had and what effect deepening to 55 feet and further
narrowing the channel will have on naval ship traffic in
the Hampton Roads area. It is further recommended that
the Commuander Naval Base, Norfolk (COMNAVBASE) as the
Area Conmnander, be designated to act as CINCLANTFLT's
agent in the review; additional representation to be
provided by COMNAVAIRLANT, COMNAVSURFLANT, COMSUBLANT,
COMSECONDFLT, and COMTRALANT.
8. That in view of the changes already in effect
restricting channel width in key areas of the Hampton
Roads channel system that Type Commanders (TYCOMS) and
COMSECONDFLT be directed to incorporate guidance in
their standing orders requiring capital ships to utilize
pilot services from the entrance to Chesapeake Bay to
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the pier when returning to the Norfolk area after an
extended deployment of three months or more.
9. That the U.S. Coast Guard be requested to ensure that
commercial ships anchor close to the center of berths
"XM, "Y", and OZO and further that the VPA be apprised
of this request.
10. That the EISENHOWER discontinue the practice of
allowing non-qualified JOOD's to conn the ship during
sea and anchor detail in order to achieve
qualifications. The JOOD should be considered under
instruction until fully qualified.
11. That JOOW qualification requirements on EISENHOWER
include in-depth training and hands on practical
experience on the RAYCAS. As a minimum, a bridge watch
officer should be able to determine closest point of
approach (CPA), course, speed, bearing drift, and
course and speed to avoid collision. Additionally,
RAYCAS should be available to the JOOW during sea and
anchor detail.
12. That a standing EISENHOWER Sea and Anchor detail for
bridge watch officers be established.
13. That internal communications policy aboard EISENHOWER
be reviewed to ensure that shipping information is
available at all times to the Piloting Officer.
14. That every surface contact be plotted on EISENHOWER's
Dead Reckoning Table (DRT) from time of designation
until the contact is "scrubbed" by the OOD.
[Ref. l:p. 24-26]
The recommendations proposed by the Navy JAG
investigation for discipline of the CO, Navigator, QOD, JOOW,
Navigation Officer, and Piloting Officer were all carried out
at through non-judicial punishment at Admiral's Mast in
September 1988. The careers of the CO and Navigator were
negatively influenced by the decisions rendered at Admiral's
Mast. The CO was assigned to a position as Professor of Naval
Science (PNS) at a Midwest college. The CO was in a position
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to achieve flag rank upon his successful transfer from the
EISBWOWMER; he was never selected for admiral and retired 2
years later. The Navigator was transferred to a shore billet
at an operational aviation squadron; he was never selected for
0-6 (captain) or for command at sea and retired 3 years later.
As the investigation uncovered, the actions taken by
the CO, Navigator, and bridge watch team were not sufficient
to avoid collision with the URDULIZ. The ensuing chapter will
build on these investigations and provide an additional
interpretation of the circumstances surrounding the
EISEVHOWER's transit of Entrance Reach Channel.
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IV. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
In most cases, two descriptive investigations by two
independent entities would be more than necessary to identify
and evaluate the causes of the collision. However, the time
invested to investigate the collision may have hampered the
process. In the Navy's investigation, the period of time that
elapsed from the initiation of the investigation to the final
recommendations totalled less than one month (29 August to 19
September 1988). On the other hand, the NTSB investigation
lasted over 16 months. Also, there was a striking difference
in the content of the two investigations. Some factors,
causal in this author's opinion, were not given due
consideration in either investigation and are important to
bring out. Without the proper identification of the causes,
the solutions generated to avoid situations like this in the
future can only be a partial panacea.
There were five factors, from this author's perspective
that needed greater elaboration. The first three are
management issues compatible with the points brought out by
Perrow in his book Normal Accidents. The final two factors
consider the role of Port Operations and the Coast Guard.
This chapter will examine these factors which the author
perceives as critical to the overall understanding of the
EISENHOWER collision.
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A. Bridge Watch Ozganization
The makeup of a bridge watch team is comprised of an OOD,
JOOD/Conning Officer, and JOOW. As defined earlier, the OOD
has overall responsibility during his watch for the ship's
operations and movement. The CO vests his confidence and
trust in the OOD to assist him in carrying out the duties of
operating the Navy's largest naval vessel. The OOD's command
relationship with the CO is stated in Navy Regulations,
Article 1008: "Every person on board who is subject to the
orders of the CO, except the XO, and those officers specified
in Article 1009, shall be subordinate to the OOD." [Ref. 2:p.
24] However, the ultimate responsibility for any action
taken, or not taken, by an OOD is the COs, yet that trust also
dictates that an OOD be prepared to execute any and all
initiative in a situation requiring prompt and immediate
action. This trust is the foundation of all bridge teams; any
breach of that trust by a watch team member jeopardizes the
ship and, more importantly, the crew.
The organizational structure of bridge watch teams on the
RISENHOWER must be identified as a factor in the collision.
In Article 1009 of Navy Regulations, the relationship of the
OOD to the Navigator is stated: "The navigation officer shall
advise the OOD of a safe course to be steered and the OOD
shall regard such advice as sufficient authority to change the
course, but shall..." immediately report the change to the
CO. [Ref. 2:p. 24] Nowhere in the article does it specify that
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the OOD must concur with the Navigator's recommendation of
course or speed changes. In this case, day watches were
structured, by some OOD's, around the whims of the Navigator,
and how he desired the ship to be operated, not navigated.
This, in effect, took the CO's vested authority from the OOD
and established him as a "parrot" for the Navigator's wishes.
In many instances, this wresting of control from the OOD
formed doubt among the watch team as to its role. The
autonomy exercised by the Navigator usurped the duties and
responsibilities of the OOD and contributed to making him a
non-player in decisionmaking - challenging his reason for
being qualified. This occurred on numerous occasions when
particular OODs were on the bridge with the Navigator present.
The Navigator's interference in OOD-related ship control
scenarios forced those affected OODs to structure their watch
to the Navigator's desires rather than maintaining the "big
picture" of the surrounding environment.
In addition, reliance on the Navigator was a problem
because his reasoning was, at times, illogical. OODs rarely
questioned his authority, but his working knowledge of the
basics in navigation and in piloting a large vessel were not
the mark of a proficient shiphandler. On numerous occasions
the Navigator would make a determination on how the ship
should be handled in certain situations, yet the decision went
against all traditional shiphandling practices.
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Among the Navigator's unconventional habits: his
propensity to navigate on the chart with the use of his
fingers vice navigation dividers. Upon discovering the
intended distance with his fingers, he would base the entire
leg of that transit on the crudely estimated interval. This
practice was not just used on open ocean transits, but it was
employed entering into foreign anchorages where the
consequences of anchoring within a certain distance (usually
3 NM) of land could create an international incident. The
EISENHOWER is a nuclear carrier, and thus foreign governments
require that the ship remain outside 3 NM for safety reasons.
On one occasion, entering into Palma de Mallorca, Spain, the
ship actually anchored too close and was "asked" by local
authorities to pick up anchor and move farther out to sea
[Ref. 8]. This is just one result of his "simplification" of
navigational policies. In the end, the OOD's blind reliance
on the Navigator's "knowledge" created a detrimental form of
dependence.
The OOD, also the Assistant Navigator, was one of those
officers who responded this way towards the Navigator. One of
the main reasons why he concurred with the Navigator's
decision to slow the ship to "bare steerageway" in Entrance
Reach Channel was because the Navigator was his department
head. He trusted the Navigator unfailingly, even though, as
brought out in both investigations, the OOD was a "... capable
and experienced shiphandler..." who could make his own
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independent determination of the situation. The fact that the
OOD was an excellent shiphandler and conning officer should
have influenced his actions that morning. Proficiency in both
the JOOD and OOD positions must be used to deal with
precarious situations at sea. The OOD knew where the wind was
blowing from (port beam) and was aware, from the entering port
brief, of the expected tidal currents. So, why did he allow
himself to be guided by the inexperience of the Navigator?
Perhaps his own inexperience as a sea and anchor 0OD played a
major role.
The reason he was O0D that morning was due to his
incessant desire to be the 0OD when the ship came into
Norfolk. As the Assistant Navigator and responsible for
watchbill assignments, it was easy to give himself the
assignment. Having never performed in that role, and wanting
to show his boss (the Navigator) and the CO he had the ability
to "bring the ship in", plus the proud distinction of being
the entering port OOD, was more than enough reason for putting
himself in the role. Allowing both men in those positions -
a Navigator without navigational skills and an OOD without the
prior experience was an absolute error in judgment by those in
authority.
B. Non-essential Personnel on the Bridge
Throughout the NTSB and Navy JAG investigations the
subject of non-essential personnel on the bridge surfaced.
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However, the issue was never established as a contributory
factor in the collision. Of the 3 officers on watch and the
Helm Safety Officer, all pronounced, in interviews with the
author, their disgust with the number of "oglers" on the
bridge. The NTSB investigation estimated
"...at least twenty crewmembers (CO, Navigator, OOD,
JOOD, JOOW, TOP Officer Liaison, Navigation Officer,
Navigation Plotter, visual bearing recorder, QMOW, 2
helmsmen, a lee helmsman, 2 visual bearing takers, and at
least 5 sound-powered phone talkers connected to various
stations throughout the ship. In addition, there were 6-
8 "Tigers", news media representatives who interviewed
the CO, and an undetermined number of other crewmembers
on the bridge observing the activities."[Ref. 2:p. 6]
The usual number of personnel on the bridge during a
routine underway watch never exceeded 15. On the morning of
the collision the number ranged, based on accounts from those
interviewed, between 36 and 45 personnel. Granted, the number
of personnel would increase for an evolution like sea and
anchor (3-4 additional phone talkers), but a three-fold
increase created confusion and disorder for the bridge team.
Not only was it difficult to hear, but it was difficult to
actively move around on the bridge. As the ship drew nearer
to the pier, the din on the bridge grew, prompting the OOD to
request "silence on the bridge" three times [Refs. 5, 6, 7].
Not once did the COD request personnel leave the bridge.
During one other less eventful occasion, this same OOD had
requested unauthorized personnel to depart the bridge.
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Why did he not do the same the morning of the collision?
One explanation is the presence of the media crews. Throwing
people off the bridge would not have created the proper
ambience, and may have drawn a negative response from the
Navigator. The Navigator, however, was preoccupied,
impressing his "Tigers" and the news media about the ship's
exploits in the Mediterranean. Any outburst on the bridge
would have drawn unwelcome attention. So, the OOD permitted
the noise to grow to a point where orders had to be shouted
and the CO, who was continually burdened with "bridge guests",
could not hear the orders.
The arrival of COMCRUDESGRU TWELVE on the bridge just 7
minutes prior to the collision (0814) provided yet another
distraction for the bridge watch team and the CO [Ref. l:p.
12]. At this time the ship was still in a position to avert
disaster. Proper attention and judicious action could well
have prevented the collision. In two minutes (0816) the TOP
report would show the ship to be 200 yards right of track and
would eventually bring the watch team to a realization that
the ship was standing into danger. By then, however, it was
too late.
The distraction of the embarked flag officer entering the
bridge, the noise on the bridge, and the OOD's refusal to take
control of the situation generated an almost inescapable
predicament. Still, there were ample opportunities for the
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OOD, Navigator, JOOD, and JOOW to recognize the ship's state
and make recommendations to avoid the URDULIZ.
C. The Role of the JOOD
One point not brought out in either investigation was the
JOOD's ineffectiveness in assisting the O0D. Not only is the
JOOD responsible for conning the ship, but he is the OOD's
primary assistant. At no time did he ascertain the bearing
drift of the URDULIZ; with three alidades on the bridge and
one in AUX CONN, the JOOD had just as much responsibility to
check on the URDULIZ as the JOOW.
During all turns the JOOD is responsible for "clearing his
bridge wing"13 and determining bearing drift of any
approaching ships. The JOOD's principal function is to conn
the ship in a safe and efficient manner. The role of safety
is not just one watch officer's responsibility, but the entire
teams. By relying only on the JOOW for constant feedback on
the bearing drift of the URDULIZ, the JOOD exhibited poor
judgment and lack of initiative. Even though he was a proven
conning officer with the trust of the CO, he failed to act
accordingly in the moments prior to the collision.
13 The practice of checking the side a turn is about to be made
in to see that there are no ships in the vicinity.
65
D. The Port Operations Department
One of the most questionable opinions that resulted from
the NTSB investigation was not to find fault for the collision
with the Norfolk Port Operations Department. Throughout the
investigation the reader was led to believe that Port
Operations had control of all shipping within the Hampton
Roads waterways. After the NTSB's findings were passed down,
no recommendation was forwarded placing any fault with Port
Operations. So the question becomes, why did Port Operations
schedule the departure of the submarine with the arrival of
the EISENHOWER? The schedule at NOB and Port Operations was
flexible enough, according to the NTSB investigation, to
accommodate such modifications. Also, why were the planners
for the arrival of the EISENHOWER not able to expand their
flexibility 29 August 1988?
By allowing the submarine LIPSCOMB to enter Entrance Reach
Channel at the same time as the EISENHOWER, the Port
Operations Department neglected their own requirements of
having all naval vessels coordinate their arrival and
departure times to "avoid conflict with other naval vessel
movements in the harbor." Although this is their statement of
how traffic in the area waterways is to be controlled, Port
Operations made no effort to ensure the minimization of
traffic in the harbor for the EISENHOWER's return.
The most beneficial duty the Port Operations Department
provides is waterway management in the Hampton Roads area.
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The task of overseeing the safe and efficient transportation
of those channels is the number one priority of the
department; the scheduling of naval vessel movements is a
integral part of that process. The Port Operations
Department's schedule of events for the morning of 29 August
1988 was a poorly managed, disorganized attempt at carrying
out its duties. Blame or fault should have been imposed on
Port Operations for their handling of the traffic in the
waterway that morning, and their inflexibility in
accommodating change. Neither investigation produced any
finding of fault.
Z. The Coast Guard's Role
In both investigations the Coast Guard's role in the
collision was downplayed, yet underscoring most of tLe
investigations' findings was the fact that the channel was
ill-marked and that it posed problems for conning crews
entering the Norfolk Harbor. The northern edge of Entrance
Reach Channel was not clearly marked with buoys. Prior to the
changes, the northern boundary had been clearly marked with a
buoy system that allowed a natural range for conning crews to
determine their position in the Channel. The reason for not
providing this buoy range subsequent to the upgrades on
Entrance Reach Channel was the "...hazard to navigation" that
it would pose. Vessels, as determined by the Coast Guard,
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would only run over these buoys, increasing the amount of
manpower and cost of constantly replacing them.
The Coast Guard's decision, therefore, sacrificed safety
for economics. Coast Guard authorities were "requested' in
the recommendations of the NTSB investigation to 0[E] stablish
additional buoys on the northern side of the Entrance Reach
Channel to delineate the Channel limits."[Ref. 2:p. 40] This
was the extent of the reprimand the Coast Guard received for
their ill-conceived channel limits marking plan on one of the
busiest waterways on the East Coast. By allowing the channel
boundaries to be interpreted by ship conning crews, the Coast
Guard's main function, to provide and maintain safe,
efficient, and clearly marked waterways, was severely
degraded. The Coast Guard's role in the collision of the
EISENHOWER and the URDULIZ is undeniable; their approach in
the channel's buoy system permitted the ambiguity in entering
Norfolk Harbor.
One other item of interest in the investigation conducted
by the NTSB shows the Coast Guard's inefficient handling of
their own regulations. The RNA, established by the Coast
Guard to thwart smaller pleasure vessels from closing on a
naval vessel attempting to go pier-side, did not prove
effective. The regulation requires that: "...no vessel may
come within 500 yards from a aircraft carrier... restricted in
its ability to maneuver...transiting the Elizabeth River
between NOB and Norfolk Naval Shipyard." If the naval vessel
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Orequests" assistance from the Coast Guard, then the Coast
Guard will provide two patrol boats stationed on the bow and
the stern of the incoming carrier. Why should a carrier have
to request assistance? The RNA, established by the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 33 Paragraph 165.501(d)(11),
was requested by the Navy in 1982 to, "...prevent accidents
due to the reduced maneuverability of vessels caused by slow
speeds at which the vessels have to operate... in the
vicinity of NOB. What is even more interesting is that the
Navy had the foresight to plan for the increasing amounts of
traffic in 1982 when the Norfolk Harbor Reach Channel was
still 1,500 feet wide. The width at the time of the accident
was 1,000 feet and the Coast Guard provided no patrol boat
assistance for the EISENHOWER on the morning of the collision.
Again, the Coast Guard's part in the collision cannot be
summarily dismissed; their role in the channel boundaries and
the lack of patrol boat assistance are factors in the
collision.
F. Sumary
Five least explained and explored areas of the NTSB and
Navy JAG Investigations have been identified by this author as
contributory to the collision, giving the reader a stronger
base of understanding why the collision occurred. The five
areas discussed included: bridge watch organization, non-
essential personnel on the bridge, and the roles played by the
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JOOD, Port Operations, and the Coast Guard. The general lack
of attention given to these factors is puzzling to this
author. The reasons for this are purely speculative.
The Navy's oversights may have been due to time
constraints. The EISENHOWER was placed in a routine 30 day
standdown following her deployment. After the standdown, the
ship was scheduled for a six month overhaul in the navy
shipyard; in order to get to the shipyard the ship had to get
underway. Knowing that the CO was going to be relieved and
not wanting the ship to get underway without a CO (not a
possibility), the Navy pushed to have the investigation
completed prior to the scheduled yard period.
The NTSB's oversights may have been due to the limited
background of the investigators in management issues, three of
the key factors noted by this author. The NTSB investigation
noted in their findings that the EISENHOWER bridge
organization was in need of a more structured bridge
environment to develop proper communication channels. This
finding was limited to one line in the investigation.
Consequently, this author speculates that the NTSB




How does the EISBN1HOWER collision compare to published
accounts of accidents at sea? In his book, Normal Accidents,
Charles Perrow describes the basis for many accidents due to
modern technology. His thesis reveals that many accidents
occur because of the restrictive nature (tight coupling) and
the interactive complexity of technological systems. A matrix
explains Perrow's typology of accidents.
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Perrow describes the matrix as a combination of the two
elements necessary for a system accident. The variables,
coupling and interaction, are largely independent and anchor
two sides of the matrix that produces four quadrants. In each
quadrant, Perrow places certain systems based on their degree
of interaction and coupling.
Each quadrant subjectively measures the amount of
interaction and coupling that should take place in a system of
this sort. Examples of systems high in coupling, or tight
coupling, are dams, power grids, and nuclear power plants.
Tightly coupled systems, in quadrants 1 and 2, have the
following tendencies:
"* delays in processing not possible;
"* invariant sequences;
"* only one method to achieve goal;
* little slack possible in supplies, equipment, personnel;
"* buffers and redundancies are designed-in, deliberate;
"* and, substitutions of supplies, equipment, personnel are
limited and designed-in.[Ref. 3:p. 95]
Loose coupling, on the other hand, has systems such as
most manufacturing, universities, R&D firms, and mining.
Loosely coupled systems, in quadrants 3 and 4, have the
following tendencies:
* processing delays possible;
* order of sequences can be changed;
0 alternative methods available;
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"* slack in resources possible;
"* buffers and redundancies fortuitously available;
"* and, substitutions fortuitously available. [Ref. 3:p. 96]
Perrow also describes the placement of linear and complex
systems on the interaction axis. The linear systems,
according to Perrow, have these tendencies:
"* equipment spread out;
"* segregated production steps;
"* common-mode connections limited to power supply and
environment.
"* easy isolation of failed components;
"* less personnel specialization;
"* extensive substitution of supplies and materials;
"* few unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops;
"* control parameters few, direct, and segregated;
"* direct, on-line information sources;
"* and, extensive understanding of all processes.
[Ref. 3:p. 88]
Linear-based systems tend to be located in quadrants 1 and
3. Systems of this variety include: assembly-line production,
rail transport, and marine transport. Perrow identifies
marine transport as being towards the center of linear and
complex interaction, but relatively high (tight) on coupling.
The properties of complex systems can be summarized as:
"• tight spacing of equipment;
"* proximate production steps;
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"* many common-mode connections of components not in
production sequence;
"* limited isolation of failed components;
"* personnel specialization limits awareness of
interdependencies;
"* unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops;
"* many control parameters with potential interactions;
"• indirect or inferential information sources;
"* and, limited understanding of some processes.
[Ref. 3:p. 88]
Complex systems include DNA research, military adventures,
nuclear weapons accidents.
The key to linear and complex systems is R... the awareness
of interdependencies..." between the parts, units, or
subsystems in a system. In complex systems, Perrow explains,
unanticipated interdependencies are more likely because of the
higher rate of failure of a part or unit. Among his theories:
marine transport, high in coupling and low in interaction, is
an error-inducing system, whereby ships will spend thousands
of dollars for the newest navigation equipment enabling them
to take even greater risks. He feels that in a highly
(tightly) coupled system, failures appear to be continuous.
However, with the slowness of shipping, recovery from
potential accidents, he hypothesizes, should almost always be
possible.
Although Perrow's thesis is beneficial for the typology he
submits, the EISENHOWER collision does not, in this author's
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view, fit into any of the quadrants proposed by Perrow's
interaction/coupling matrix of a Onormal accidentm. Perrow's
definition of a "normal accident" is centered on the
technological aspects of system failures. The EISENHOWER
collision was not a technology-induced accident. Rather, it
was a mishap caused by the organizational flaws present in the
bridge watch team. His thesis does reinforce the argument
that the error-inducing character of a ship lies in the social
organization of a ship. [Ref. 3:p. 10] This is the
underpinning of the EISENHOWER collision.
The NTSB investigation revealed taat bridge management and
team coordination principles were not adequately emphasized in
the training of shipboard COs and bridge navigation personnel
on Navy vessels [Ref. 2:p. 38]. This finding is strikingly
similar to what Perrow specifies. The organization is the
centerpiece of many accident inquiries. Operators (OODs) must
have the latitude to be able to take action. An evolution
such as sea and anchor detail or entering port must be a
tightly coupled procedure where the risk of error is
controlled by following a precise and explicit check-off list.
The opportunity for a proactive style of management by the OOD
or his watch team is always present, but in certain
evolutions, entering port and sea and anchor detail, the
likelihood is lessened.
As for classifying the EISENHOWER collision a "normal
accident", Perrow's typology does not, in the author's mind,
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conform to the events related to the collision. The important
contribution from the Perrow book is his recognition that for
a ship to be operated efficiently it must have a stable, well-
coordinated social organization. At the time of the
collision, the EISENHOWER's bridge organization was in utter
disarray.
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V. SUOIMRY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. A Final Viewpoint
The following question inspired the analysis of the
EISENHOWER collision.
(1) What were the contributory factors that led to the
collision? And in particular, why did established entering
port procedures systematically breakdown in the moments prior
to the collision?
(2) To what extent was the U.S. Navy JAG Investigation
supported by the NTSB Investigation?
(3) Was the collision a "normal accident" as defined by
Charles Perrow?
(4) And finally, did the collision change COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR
FORCES, ATLANTIC (CNAL) and COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR FORCES,
PACIFIC (CNAP) procedures for aircraft carriers entering port
after extended deployments?
The research process was limited to unclassified materials and
sources. The primary sources for the analysis were the NTSB
investigation, the U.S. Navy JAG investigation, and personal
interview data obtained from the OOD, JOOD, JOOW, and Helm
Safety Officer.
The EISENHOWER collided with the URDULIZ due to the lack
of timely, prudent action by the CO, Navigator, OOD, and JOOD.
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By examining the investigations and having firsthand knowledge
of the EISENHOWER's bridge watch team organization, the author
also identified numerous other causal factors that were not
thoroughly considered by the NTSB or JAG. The author also
determined other contributory factors in the collision (as
described in the text) that were not fully explored in either
investigation. Some of these include the following:
"* The JOOD's position on the watch team is one that
continuously assists the O0D in his duties. Conning the
ship is only one of the many responsibilities of the JOOD.
Neither investigation pointed out the fact that the JOOD
never determined the bearing drift of the URDULIZ prior
to, during, or after the turn to 2290 (the opening to the
Entrance Reach Channel). The view that he was an
unqualified JOOD and an Ensign and should not be held
accountable for his lack of proper action is without
merit. The investigation's presumption that he was a
"parrot" for the OOD's orders is accurate in most
instances; however, it does not excuse or ralieve him from
his responsibility of standing a proper, vigilant watch.
"* Norfolk Port Operations' role in the collision is also a
contributory factor in the collision. The regulations of
the department were not even observed the morning of the
collision, yet neither investigation considered this
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unusual. The Department's requirement to keep two deep
draft vessels from meeting in the channel was overlooked
by the investigators, and was not even judged to be a
causal factor.
* Finally, the Coast Guard's inability to foresee the
necessity for channel boundary markers (buoys) to
delineate the northern edge of Entrance Reach Channel was
not perceived to be a factor in the collision. By not
properly marking the channel edge, the Coast Guard was
remiss in its most primary function: to provide safe and
efficient waterways for waterborne transportation.
With regard to the first research question concerning the
breakdown of required procedures, the author determined:
"* Over reliance on the Navigator by certain OODs prevented
the OODs from initiating action and thinking through
problems on their own. Instead they believed that
"whatever the 'Gator said was right." This reliance on
one individual, whose skills were suspect, contributed to
poor problem solving and decisionmaking by the watch team.
The Navigator's charisma and ability to downplay potential
danger compounded this problem. It also led to the
breakdown in communication between the CO, Navigator, and
OOD.
"* Both investigations probed the question of too many non-
essential personnel on the bridge at the time of the
collision. Neither considered it a contributory factor in
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the collision. Of the officers interviewed by the author,
all felt that the noise on the bridge that morning was too
loud. As explained in the text, the normal number of
personnel on the bridge during a sea and anchor detail was
approximately 20. On the morning of the collision the
number was closer to 40-42. The extraneous stimuli on
the bridge created confusion and induced those on the
bridge to filter out relevant information.
How complementary were the two investigations by the Navy
JAG and the NTSB? Given the fact that the Navy's
investigation was originated, developed, and finalized prior
to the NTSB's, it is likely that the NTSB investigation used
some of the relevant facts in its own inquiry.
The chief consideration in the JAG investigation was to
establish blame and take prompt punitive action against those
officers and enlisted personnel involved, and to assist
attorneys in litigation matters. However, in its 30 day limit
to determine the causes, the Navy overlooked several
additional factors that unequivocally contributed to the
collision on 29 August 1988 (i.e., role of Port Operations,
Coast Guard, meteorological conditions, etc.,)
The NTSB's primary responsibility was to determine the
overall cause/causes of the collision and report those
findings. The NTSB is an agency mandated by the federal
government to investigate and determine the causes of
accidents, issue safety recommendations, study safety issues,
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and evaluate the safety of all government agencies involved in
transportation. Therefore, the nature of the two
investigations and their goals differed. On the whole, the
NTSB did support the JAG's and did rely on facts from the
Navy's investigation, but it did not use the JAG's framework
to determine responsibility. Finally, the author was unable
to completely resolve the fourth research question pertaining
to the current entering port procedures of CNAL and CNAP.
After the collision, a Special Sea and Anchor Detail team was
instituted on the EISENHOWER. Whether this procedure was
adopted by all carriers under the cognizant commands of CNAL
and CNAP is unknown. The EISENHOWER Special Sea and Anchor
team was the only team authorized by the new CO to pilot the
ship in and out of port. Also, only watch personnel were
allowed on the bridge during special evolutions. The QMOW
would actually tape shut the doorway to the bridge to keep
away curious onlookers.
As for pilots, the Navy quickly established a requirement
that all naval vessels away from her homeport over three
months would employ a pilot. The regulation was not fully
enforced, however, and the practice was again left to the CO's
discretion. This return to past procedure occurred in 1989,
one year after the collision, when the novelty of it had worn
off. When the author departed the EISENHOWER, the process of
entering port was a common procedure because of the ship's
active schedule. Old habits returned; the reappearance of
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non-essential personnel on the bridge during special
evolutions again was a problem. The use of pilots did occur
on the EISENHOWER, but the procedure was not strictly
enforced. Overall, the months following the collision were
filled with extreme caution on the waterways around Hampton
Roads. After a year, the routine of not employing a pilot was
reestablished.
B. Recommendations
The EISENHOWER collision was undeniably avoidable. Had
the ship been equipped with a training device (a simulator
that perhaps could be operated through the Naval Tactical Data
System - NTDS) that could reproduce any type of natural
weather phenomena (tidal current, wind, visibility, etc.,) the
probability of the collision may have been decreased. A
simulator of this type is located at the Naval Education and
Training Center (NETC) Newport, Rhode Island. The simulator
is used to train incoming SWOs on proper shiphandling skills
and orders. The size of the simulator could be reduced to fit
on surface ships; this could expand the amount of training
junior and senior officers involved in bridge operations
receive, and at the same time provide abnormal scenarios that
teach the "student" to react. Programnming in alternative
scenarios, the simulator would provide limitless opportunities
for those bridge officers to hone their skills.
82
The risk involved in operating the largest naval vessel
can never be completely eliminated just as the risk of driving
a car can never be eliminated. What can be controlled, to
some extent, is the training environment. The inclusion of a
simulator-type training aid for afloat commands would greatly
enhance the professionalism and skills of shiphandlers,
navigators, and commanding officers.
C. Future Research
It is hoped that future research of this type will
continue. All parties can benefit from improvements in the
investigative process. What is learned by one may benefit the
whole in the long term. The benefits of further analysis may
also expand the understanding of how such incidents can occur,
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